THOUGHTS

ON THE

Diſmiſſion of Officers,

CIVIL or MILITARY

FOR THEIR

CONDUCT in PARLIAMENT.

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MUSEUM BRITANNICUM

PREFACE.

THE writer of the following pages thinks proper to premiſe, for the ſatisfaction of the reader——that he has no ſeat in parliament——no office, civil or military——no intereſt with any adminiſtration in *eſſe* or in *poſſe*——no acquaintance with any leading men of the majority or minority——no knowledge of the ſecret tranſactions or ſecret views of either party——and, in ſhort, no other right to addreſs himſelf to the public or any political ſubject, than that which he conceives to belong by inheritance to every Engliſhman, who is acquainted with ſuch fundamental principles of the conſtitution

of

of his country, as it is a diſgrace to an Engliſhman not clearly to comprehend, or not duly to prize.

The reader therefore is to expect neither curious anecdotes, nor the refinements and myſteries of policy: much leſs panegyric or invective on particular perſons. If he meets with a little plain ſenſe, and a few ſubſtantial reaſons, founded in a true apprehenſion of the nature of the Britiſh conſtitution; the writer's end will be fully anſwered.

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ON THE

DISMISSION of OFFICERS, &c.

THAT the crown has an abſolute right of diſmiſſion over ſuch of its ſervants and officers, as hold not their places under ſome other ſecurity than the royal pleaſure; is a propoſition in appearance almoſt identical, and, indeed, if confined to a certain ſenſe, not to be controverted.

This right is often compared to that, which a maſter of a family poſſeſſes, of

parting with his ſervants, ſo ſoon as they begin to be diſagreeable to him, without being bound to give any account of his reaſons for ſo doing. The compariſon holds tolerably well, in a looſe eaſy way of applying it. But I would beg leave to hint to the next perſon who ſhall think proper to lay any great ſtreſs upon it, that there is at leaſt a ſlight difference in the two caſes, ariſing from a circumſtance of diſtinction not always attended to. If the ſervant of a ſubject be diſcharged, he provides himſelf with a new ſervice, or if he cannot, it is through his own fault. But if a ſervant of the public be diſplaced, to whom ſhall he betake himſelf? His duty to the public and to his Sovereign, and his obligation to general ſervices remain, tho' his particular ſervices, and the emolument ariſing from them to himſelf, be extinct.

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Whatever advantages he enjoyed in the poſſeſſion of his place, he is deprived of them, without receiving any viſible compenſation, and without a power of obtaining any by an application elſewhere. This perhaps is not the only circumſtance of diſtinction that might be mentioned; but it is the only one with which I think it neceſſary to trouble the reader.

The matter of right then being taken as an uncontrovertible principle, it may be proper to enquire a little, what kind of right this is? For there are rights, which are called ſo, only becauſe they are not in a ſtrict and legal ſenſe wrongs: rights, which are conſiſtent with the violation of the moſt tender and ſacred regards, of the laws of equity, honor, and humanity. Now, if there ſhould appear any reaſon to ſuſpect, that the right thus agreed on is of this kind; there will remain, notwithſtanding ſuch agreement, an ample

field for diſcuſſing the matter before us, in a moral, as well as a political view.

A favor granted without conſideration of any real or ſuppoſed claim, title, or merit, in the receiver, and by the terms or nature of the grant, merely dependent on the will of the granter; ſuch a favor, and I think no other, may be withdrawn fairly and juſtly, without the allegation or pretence of any default in the receiver. But, tho' it be held never ſo abſolutely at will; yet, if it be eſteemed or ſuppoſed to be, in any degree, either a reward of ſervices, or dependent on them for its continuance; the withdrawing of it implies ſome diſcovery or ſome change to the diſcredit of the perſon who enjoyed it——that either he was not ſo deſerving as he appeared, or is become leſs ſo. To one of theſe cauſes it muſt be attributed; except where a third ſuppoſition chances to obtrude itſelf upon us——

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that he both was, and continues to be, as meritorious as ever he appeared; but that thro' ſome fatal miſrepreſentation, miſapprehenſion, or other *extraordinary* accident or change of circumſtances, his plea of merit is over-ruled.

Now it would be highly diſreſpectful to the wiſdom of government, to ſuppoſe that offices of truſt were ever beſtowed on others than ſuch as had gained a title to them by their paſt ſervices, or were expected to be ſerviceable in futuro, by the faithful diſcharge of the duties incident to their offices. And if ſo; they are not to be conſidered as meer favors, ſuch as, being beſtowed without regard to merit, may be withdrawn at pleaſure, without any reaſon given, and without cauſe or colour of complaint. It may be no violation of any abſolute and perfect right; it may not, ſtrictly ſpeaking, be an unlawful and injurious act, ſo to withdraw them:

them: but it may be contrary to the rules of equity or prudence. Such meaſures indeed are amenable to no court of judicature, except that which is ſeated in the breaſt of every thinking man.

From the juriſdiction of that court, there is no authority on earth that can exempt them. And I hope the deference I pay to it will not be conſtrued as *a contempt of the court of King's Bench*, or any other court in the world.

Taking it then for granted, that ſuch exerciſes of miniſterial power are not to be looked upon merely as acts of power; but that the propriety, and even the rectitude of them, are proper ſubjects of debate; I proceed to the examination of the following queſtion.

Whether it be equitable and politic, to diſplace an officer, civil or military

tary, ſolely for his conduct in parliament?

1. And firſt, for the equity of the meaſure.

Here I am aware, at my ſetting out, of the antiquated ſtyle and method of reaſoning, into which my ſubject will lead me. I foreſee that I ſhall be obliged to ſpeak in the language of thoſe, who pique themſelves on their patriotiſm, their conſcience, and their honor: a language which, when uſed in the diſcuſſion of a political queſtion, is, to refined politicians, either contemptible, or, from diſuſe, unintelligible. The reader therefore, who is of this ſuperior caſt, will do well to paſs over this article, which treats of the equity of the meaſures in queſtion. I may poſſibly have the honor to adapt myſelf more to his ideas of things in the ſubſequent. But, in the mean time, I beg

leave

leave to recommend one hint to his conſideration, leaſt he ſhould altogether deſpiſe me for beſtowing a few pages on theſe antiquated notions.——That, however chimerical they may appear to the firſt-rate politicians of this enlightened age, it is generally thought prudent to maintain ſome degree of outward reſpect to them; that they are at leaſt popular and plauſible; that they give credit to a cauſe, and are ſometimes employed, and that by no inconſiderable maſters in the ſcience, as uſeful auxiliaries, where they can be made ſubſervient to ſome more important object.

The firſt duty of every man, who ſerves his country as one of its repreſentatives in parliament, is to conſult the public good. All private obligations to a miniſter, or even to his ſovereign, are of an inferior nature. Indeed, as the real intereſt of prince and people are eſſential-

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ly and invariably the ſame, it is impoſſible to promote the one without the other. Every man who is ſolicitous for the ſupport and preſervation of government, which every man in a public ſtation ought to be, will concur with the meaſures of an adminiſtration, whenever his ſober judgment informs him that they are likely to contribute to this main end. But, whether they be ſo or not, is a queſtion that muſt be left to his private judgment to be determined. To controul his exerciſe of private judgment, is to deprive him of that liberty, without which he cannot diſcharge the duties he owes to the public. To puniſh him for making uſe of ſuch liberty, is an implied denial of that independency, which the conſtitution ſuppoſes him to poſſeſs: it is to declare war againſt the freedom of parliament, which is the great bulwark againſt arbitrary government. The fear of being deprived of ſuch emoluments

as he enjoys from the favour of the crown, in conſequence of his oppoſition to meaſures which he thinks detrimental to the public, reduces him to the diſagreeable dilemma of renouncing either his own private intereſt (and that in ſo tender a point as parting with what he has actually in poſſeſſion) or the intereſt of his country. Happy is the man who has virtue enough to make the former his choice! But an honeſt man ought not to be expoſed lightly to ſuch a temptation.

The infliction of this puniſhment cannot be juſtified otherwiſe, than by aſſerting the oppoſition to have proceeded from corrupt views; or, at leaſt, from an error of judgment that requires to be rectified by ſo violent a remedy. But who has a right to aſſert this? Is the miniſter a proper judge in a cauſe where he himſelf is a party? If ſo, it

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muſt be on ſome principle widely different from the ordinary and eſtabliſhed rules of equity. A member of parliament is anſwerable for his conduct in that capacity only to God and his country. He is appointed by that country as one of its guardians againſt all wrongs and incroachments, from whatever quarter they proceed. If he diſcover, or think that he diſcovers, any evil tendency in the conduct of an adminiſtration; he is bound to oppoſe it. And if by ſuch oppoſition he incurs the reſentment of the miniſtry, to the hurt of his fortune and embarraſſement of his affairs; the public has reaſon to complain of this, as an unjuſt attack upon its moſt ſacred privileges.

Perhaps it will be ſaid, that the ſame reaſoning concludes equally againſt a miniſter endeavouring to influence a member of parliament by any lucrative

conſideration at all. Indeed, I am afraid it would be difficult to prove any meaſure of that kind ſtrictly defenſible.

But there is a wide difference between the tempting a man to be diſhoneſt, and the puniſhing him for being honeſt. The one excites our indignation, and cauſes us to lament, that the buſineſs of government ſhould be carried on by ſuch ignoble means; means tending, tho' perhaps by ſlow degrees, to deſtroy the balance of government, and with it the government itſelf. The other alarms us with the apprehenſion that ſuch evil tendency has begun to take effect, that the maſk is already pulled off, and war declared in form againſt our liberties.

But gratitude obliges every man to comply with the meaſures of the court, who enjoys advantages from its favor. It does ſo, where ſuch compliance leads not to a breach of the ſacred truſt repoſed in him by

by his country. For whatever obligations he may be under to the court; he is under greater to the public.

It may be urged, that where his duty will not allow him to concur with the adminiſtration, he ought to reſign. To this I anſwer, that his obligations to a miniſter, where he not is bound by particular promiſes, ſubſiſt no longer than the miniſter acts an upright part——that they are inferior and ſecondary to thoſe which he lies under to his ſovereign; whoſe intereſt, as I obſerved before, is the ſame with that of his people——and that he is not obliged, by reſigning, to ſtrengthen the hands of a party, whoſe views he has reaſon to think dangerous to the public.

The above reaſoning holds with peculiar force, in the caſe of that man who enjoys no advantages, but what he has earned in the ſervice of his country. Every officer

ficer in the army or navy, who has been advanced in the courſe of ſervice, has a right to enjoy the dignity and emoluments conſequent on his advancement, till he has forfeited them by ſome breach of his military duty, or ſome crime lawfully proved upon him againſt the ſtate. And if, without the allegation or even pretence of any ſuch miſbehaviour, he be degraded from his honor, and deſpoiled of his income; his country, which is indebted to him for his ſervices, and has chearfully defrayed the expence of his rewards, beholds with a juſt indignation a ſtep that tends to quench the ardor, and check the emulation of all who are deſirous of treading in the ſame honorable ſteps.

It is not to be denied, that every ſervant of the crown, who behaves factiouſly, indecently, or in a manner inconſiſtent with the reverence due to that power from which he derives his honors and advantages

tages, may, with propriety, be dimiſſed from its ſervice: and that ſuch puniſhment may be juſtly inflicted, in caſes which come not under the cognizance of the laws of the land. But it ſeems to me, that no parliamentary oppoſition how violent ſoever, if it be conducted without a breach of the reſpect due to the perſon and ſacred character of the ſovereign himſelf, ought ever to be conſidered in that light. For the freedom of parliaments is no leſs ſacred than the authority of the crown: and it is an eſſential branch of that freedom, to cenſure without reſerve, and to oppoſe without reſtraint, the meaſures of a miniſtry. It is a common thing for miniſters to intrench themſelves behind the royal authority, to repreſent the oppoſition to them as an attack upon government; and to brand all inſtances of it with the odious titles of diſloyalty and diſaffection. But in ſo doing, they are guilty of betraying the power that ſupports them,

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and excite juſt ſuſpicions of their fidelity to the truſt repoſed in them. If a miniſter lay claim to what even his maſter has no right to, an unlimited acquieſcence; his claim is unconſtitutional, he has other views than the ſerving either his king or his country, and power is dangerous in his hands.

I will not affront either the underſtanding, or moral ſenſe of the reader who has borne me company thus far, by ſuppoſing it neceſſary to enlarge on this branch of the queſtion; but ſhall proceed to examine the matter before us in a political view.

2. But firſt, let me premiſe, that I preſume not to interfere with, or to argue about, that myſterious and abſtruſe policy, the object of which is, the ſupport and continuance of an adminiſtration. I ſpeak only of that policy, whoſe object is, to

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ſecure to the prince that juſt proportion of power, which may enable him adequately to fill his department in the commonwealth, without incroaching on the privileges of the people. I am aware that experience will be alledged in ſupport of the meaſure in queſtion; and the ſucceſs with which it has been practiſed will be pleaded, as an inconteſtible proof of its utility. For this reaſon, I muſt beg leave to adhere to the diſtinction which I have laid down, between miniſterial and kingly policy. A diſtinction which, I hope, is not altogether without foundation.

For, altho' a miniſter who acts as a faithful ſervant to his ſovereign, has reaſon to expect all the countenance and ſupport in return, which it is conſiſtent with the character of a ſovereign to give; it cannot be ſuppoſed that the latter is obliged to deſcend from his dignity, by entering into all the intrigues, which the mi-

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niſter may think proper for the eſtabliſhing his intereſt, and ſecuring the continuance of his power. The balance of the ſeveral parties in ſuch a ſtate as ours, is, or ought to be, in the hands of the king: and ſhould he ſubmit to adopt the private views of any one of them, he would give up a moſt uſeful and honorable part of his royal prerogative. Indolence may render him averſe to the difficulties and agitations that attend a change of miniſters. Affection to thoſe, whoſe zeal and fidelity he has experienced, may incline him to wiſh for the continuance of their ſervices. But there are conjunctures, when, in ſpite of indolence or affection, it will be neceſſary for him to throw the adminiſtration into other hands.

A very unpopular miniſter can hardly be a good one. Knowing on how inſecure a footing he ſtands, he is full of jealouſies and ſuſpicions. And thus circum-

cumſtanced, he muſt be poſſeſſed of a very uncommon ſhare of virtue and public ſpirit, if he make uſe of none but fair and honeſt means, to enlarge his influence and ſtrengthen his party. In proportion as he is diſagreeable to the people; they, in their turn, are averſe to his meaſures: the ſpirit of oppoſition prevails: and his moſt ſalutary ſchemes are rendered ineffectual and abortive. When things are come to this paſs; he is no longer fit to be entruſted with the conduct of affairs. And no imputation will lie on the ſovereign, who complies ſo far with the deſires of the people, be they well or ill-founded, as to take the adminiſtration out of the hands of a man, who, ſo long as he remains in power, muſt neceſſarily involve his ſovereign in the odium which he has fallen under himſelf.

It may ſeem hard, thus to ſacrifice an innocent man, nay, one perhaps who has

deſerved well of the public, to popular prejudice: But the hardſhip of the caſe renders not the ſacrifice leſs neceſſary. Merit is, in this caſe, a private and ſingle conſideration, not to be put in the balance with public utility. When a ſervant of the ſtate, and one in ſo important a ſtation as a miniſter, becomes unfit for ſervice, whether it be by his fault or his misfortune; no paſt ſervices will juſtify the continuing him in place. And as to the apparent hardſhip of the caſe; it is to be conſidered, that every miniſter knows at his ſetting out, by how precarious a tenure he is to hold——that the ſervice of a miniſter is not a dry and fruitleſs ſervice ——and that he can ſcarcely have much reaſon to complain, that he is obliged to quit the field which he has been labouring, and to leave the harveſt ungathered.

Nor has the ſovereign reaſon to apprehend any formidable difficulties in ſupply-

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ing his place. There is always good ſtore of active and ambitious men. And if a ſovereign betray not an improper levity, by changing his ſervants before the urgency of the caſe requires it; there will not be wanting perſons of reputation and ability, whom the deſire of profit or of fame, and poſſibly a more honorable motive, will diſpoſe to enter with alacrity on an employment, at once gainful, illuſtrious and important.

If a ſovereign, on the other hand, deſcend ſo low, as to be a partizan of a miniſtry; he acknowledges himſelf to be, and is in effect, their ſlave. For the neceſſity that he fancies himſelf under, of adhering to their cauſe, will be bonds and fetters to him; which they will hardly fail to draw as tight as poſſible, by raiſing ſuſpicions in his mind againſt all thoſe ſubjects who are not of their party, however well affected to his perſon and government;

ment; and by terrifying and ſeducing him into ſuch meaſures as tend to alienate their affections from him. Nay, they will not be content with acquiring a power, ſo monſtrous in its nature: they will render it ſtill more monſtrous, by exerciſing it in a tyrannical manner. And as the ſovereignty is thus tranſlated from the prince to his miniſters, the prince himſelf becomes a meer pageant, a piece of ſtate and ceremony, a ſlave and a priſoner in the midſt of homage and magnificence.

The only method a ſovereign has to ſecure his independency, is, not to attach himſelf to any miniſter or junto of miniſters, in ſuch a manner as either to be afraid of them, or by placing his whole confidence in them, to act as if he were afraid of his ſubjects. In a deſpotic government; a miniſter blindly devoted to a monarch, and a monarch blindly attached to a miniſter, are according to the natural

natural courſe of things: but far otherwiſe, in a free ſtate like ours. No miniſterial abilities, or miniſterial zeal, can give a King of Great Britain a ſecurity and a dignity equal to that, which he will gain by ſuch an open and ſpirited conduct, as ſhall indicate a mind ſatisfied of the affection of his people. The only unlimited confidence, that a King of Great Britain can place without danger, is in a free parliament.

The people of this country are much diſpoſed to be zealous and affectionate towards their ſovereign. Nor can any proof of their affection be deſired, that is for the honor and advantage of the ſovereign, which they are not ready to give. Nothing can cool the ardor of their zeal for a good prince, but the apprehenſion of his being too much under miniſterial influence. And it would be a lamentable thing, if he ſhould be reduced to depend on mi-

miniſterial artifice, when he might carry every point which ſuch a prince can aim at, without any artifice at all.

I hope enough has been ſaid, to juſtify the diſtinction above laid down, between the policy that is proper for a king, and the policy that is uſual among miniſters: and I flatter myſelf, that I ſhall not be thought unjuſt to my ſubject, if, in the further courſe of this examination, I refer wholly to the former.

Now, it certainly is for the intereſt of the prince, to be on good terms with his people. If unpopularity be a bad quality in a miniſter, it ſeems ſtill worſe in a king. It may not indeed hinder the ordinary buſineſs of government, from going on in its accuſtomed channel: it may be ſome time before any ſenſible miſchief ariſe from it. But in time of danger or difficulty, or when the prince is reduced

duced to ſuch a ſituation as to need the aſſiſtance of his people; a wide difference will appear between the prince who is poſſeſſed of the hearts of his ſubjects, and him who is not.

The people are not only ſolicitous for the ſupport and preſervation of a prince whom they love, but jealous for his honor. They ſubmit chearfully to the burthens and expences of war; and are ready to anticipate his wiſhes, in contributing to every meaſure that tends to make his name reſpectable, his alliance deſirable, and his enmity formidable. On the contrary, where they are ſuſpicious of the prince; they are backward in entruſting him with any degree of power, or furniſhing him with even the neceſſary ſupplies: they embarraſs him, both in his domeſtic and exterior policy: they are careleſs of his reputation, they render him inconſiderable

amongſt his allies, and contemptible to his enemies.

Now, of all the meaſures which a prince can make uſe of to ſtrengthen the hands of his miniſters, perhaps no one contributes more to render him unpopular, than the meaſure in queſtion. For it excites all thoſe ſuſpicions, which the minds of a people jealous of their liberties are apt to conceive againſt thoſe in power. It has the appearance, at leaſt, of an infringement of one of the moſt important privileges veſted in them by the conſtitution of the kingdom; the right of ſpeaking and voting freely by their repreſentatives.

Under a popular diſcontent ſo juſtly founded, the ſeeds of all kinds of miſchief have time and ſhelter to take root, and expand themſelves into full ſtrength and maturity. The ſpirit of diſcontent is not extinguiſhed, by being for a time ſuppreſſed:

preſſed: it waits but a favorable opportunity to break forth; and times of public perplexity can hardly fail to furniſh it with ſuch an opportunity. Then, the longer it has been ſtifled, the more furiouſly it blazes; the party which has been triumphant during a ſtate of tranquillity, is obliged to give way to the violence of oppoſition: the crown is embarraſſed; the public in confuſion; and a change of miniſtry is unavoidable, at a time when poſſibly ſuch a change is extremely hazardous both to prince and people.

It may perhaps be thought, that by maintaining the parliament in a conſtant dependence on the crown, which is the object aimed at by the meaſure in queſtion, the conſequence abovementioned of unpopularity in a king or a miniſtry may be prevented. But, ſuppoſe never ſo great an influence to be obtained over the parliament, and never ſo ſtrong an aſſurance

of their obſequiouſneſs to the court: yet what miniſter will undertake to corrupt the whole body of the people? and till that is effectually accompliſhed, and all remains of the antient Britiſh ſpirit extinct; he has done his buſineſs very imperfectly. For, when once the people are alarmed with the apprehenſion, that their rights and liberties are in danger of being betrayed by their repreſentatives; the party in oppoſition will encourage the alarm; and the parliament will be obliged to comply with the clamors of their conſtituents, till the cauſe of diſcontent be removed.

Now, as nothing but arbitrary proceedings on the ſide of the court can raiſe the ſpirit of diſcontent to ſuch an height; in order to quell the clamour and oppoſition which they have occaſioned, the crown will in all probability be enforced to make conceſſions, by which it will loſe ſome-

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thing more than the advantages it has gained. For the cauſe of liberty gains by encroachments made upon it, when once the ſpirit of liberty has found means to exert itſelf. And when it has obtained what it firſt fought; encouraged by ſucceſs, it will hardly be content without ſtill farther proofs of its victory, in repriſals on the adverſe party.

On the other hand, ſo long as the crown maintains its independence, with regard to the ſeveral contending parties, which always will ſubſiſt under a free government, ſo far as not to render itſelf accountable for the miſmanagements of that which happens to be in power; their violence will always be ſpent on each other: the crown will be in no danger of ſuffering by their mutual ſhocks; and its powers and prerogative will remain undiſputed and untouched.

Beſides

Beſides the unpopularity of the meaſure in queſtion; the reſentment which it naturally excites in the mind of the immediate ſufferer, and of all who are connected with him by intereſt or affection, renders it of very dangerous tendency. As the effects of it are permanent, the reſentment is not likely to ſubſide very ſpeedily. And, altho' the odium may fall primarily on the miniſter at whoſe inſtigation the blow was ſtruck; yet, as it was the act of an authority ſuperior to the miniſters, even the removal of the miniſter will not heal the wound. The public indeed may be ſatisfied in ſeeing a man removed from the royal counſels, whoſe meaſures they diſapproved; and their reſentment of the ſufferings of particulars may be forgotten amidſt the pleaſing proſpects which ſuch a change opens upon them: But will this be a ſufficient conſolation to the man,

who

who labors under the laſting effects of a deprivation which he is conſcious that he has not merited? Time may alleviate his ſenſe of the wrong he has received; and principles of duty, prudence, or public ſpirit, may prevent its breaking out: But the reſentment of an injured perſon is never to be deſpiſed.

There is another conſideration, which ſeems more peculiarly to affect the caſe of his majeſty's *military* ſervants: as it will be granted, I ſuppoſe, that merit is of ſome conſequence in *their* department at leaſt. I apprehend it then to be for the intereſt of the crown, to be ſerved in this department by men, who reſt their whole claim to promotion on their deſerts. When I ſpeak of *deſert* in a military officer; I intend that only, which ariſes from the exerciſe of his military functions, excluſive of all other collateral merit. For, pre-

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ferment that is conferred from any other than this ſingle conſideration, can never help to kindle that laudable ambition, which makes brave ſoldiers and ſeamen: on the contrary, it tends directly to extinguiſh it. And, if the ardor of a man, who wiſhes to riſe in the ſervice by the moſt honorable methods, is in danger of being damped by the apprehenſion, that his claim of merit may poſſibly be ſuperſeded by another of a leſs worthy kind; is no ſuch conſequence likely to enſue from the apprehenſion of being degraded, after he ſhall have arrived at the higheſt point of his ambition, and of being deprived of all the fruits of his ſervices, except the conſciouſneſs and the reputation of having performed them——and all for no other crime than refuſing to tarniſh his glory acquired in the field, by acting meanly in the ſenate?

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This conſideration is the more worthy of attention, becauſe it reſpects thoſe chiefly, who are the moſt likely to diſtinguiſh themſelves in the ſervice: men of ſtrong parts, and of an active, enterprizing ſpirit. Theſe are the qualities which enable a man to ſhine, either as a warrior or as a ſenator. It is natural for one who is poſſeſſed of them, to be inſtigated by a two-fold ambition; firſt of riſing as high as his merits can carry him, in the ſcale of military advancement; and then, of crowning his glory, in the character of a ſtateſman and a patriot.

Two ſuch animating ideas, interwoven in the breaſt of a brave man, muſt on all occaſions that offer of ſignalizing himſelf, fire him even to enthuſiaſm. And would it not be a pity, would it not give a ſenſible concern to every one who wiſhes well to

the ſervice, if the union of two ſuch noble deſigns were ever to prove chimerical? which it muſt; if ever things ſhould be reduced to that paſs, that the ſoldier, who has been uſeful to his country in his military capacity, and wiſhes to be no leſs ſo in his political, ſhould of courſe find himſelf in this dilemma; either to be degraded from his military honors, or to ſubmit to a much worſe degradation——that of becoming a ſubaltern to a miniſter.

I have reverentially refrained from entring into any conſiderations regarding that more abſtruſe and refined policy, which belongs to miniſters of ſtate. Yet, tho' not initiated into its myſteries; thus much I think I can diſcover—that the miniſter who endeavors to ſupport himſelf by ſuch meaſures as that we have examined, can never juſtly be charged with an unreaſonable timidity, or a faulty *modeſty*——and that if, in the end,

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end, even theſe meaſures ſhould fail him; he has at leaſt a title to this complement

Magnis tamen excidit AUSIS.

FINIS.

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